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SUPREME COUJlT 
OF THE 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
BEN B. ELLERBECK, also known as 
B. B. ELLERBECK, 
Deceased. 
WITTON B. ELLERBECK, 
Contestant and Appellant, 
Case No. 8010 
' 
vs .~, 
RUTH CLAYTON HAWS, 
Proponent and Respondent. 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT ., 
' 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Ju-
dicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge. 
Backman, Backman and Clark, 
Attorneys for Proponent and Respondent 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
BEN B. ELLERBECK, also known as 
B. B. ELLERBECK, 
Deceased. 
WITTON B. ELLERBECK, 
Contestant and Appellant, 
vs 
RUTH CLAYTON HAWS, 
Proponent and Respondent. 
Case No.· 8010 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
In reviewing the statement of the case made by the 
appellant, the respondent emphasizes some additional 
points: 
The testator was an unmarried man and left sur-
viving him, only his brother, the contestant of the will 
and the appellant herein. (R 4) 
That the said contestant last saw the testator in 
1938 in Salt Lake City, Utah (R 21). 
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That the will is an olographic will, therefore, in the 
writing and words of the testator, more clearly express-
ing his intention than a dictated will would have done. 
The will is in three parts: 
1. Directing Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws to take 
full charge of testator's home and such little business 
as may exist there. 
2. Ruth Clayton Haws is to have testator's com-
plete portion of the estate left by testator's father, 
Witton W. Ellerbeck. 
3. Appointing Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws to serve 
as executrix without bond. 
The testator was very concerned about some of the 
orders for gun stocks at his place of residence and wanted 
to see to it that matter was taken care of. (R 38) 
The testator wanted some bills paid, especially his 
taxes, telephone, lights, etc. (R 39) 
His concern about this business and the payment of 
his bills, prompted the first sentence of the will. 
The respondent, Ruth Clayton Haws is a first cousin 
to the testator and had close relations with him in a 
social way, (R35), she visited him on several occasions 
while he was in the hospital (35) and was present at 
his bedside at the time he made the will. (R36) 
The will was given to Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws, who 
held it in her possession until the testator returned to 
his home, when she returned it to him saying: "Well, 
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here is this will" and he said, "Well, I will show you 
where I will put it" and he put it in the cupboard (R3'6). 
The will was found the day of his death, right where he 
put it. (R36) 
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED UPON BY 
RESPONDENT 
Point 1 
THE WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE WAS AB-
SOLUTE AND NOT CONDITIONAL OR CONTINGENT. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE WAS AB-
SOLUTE AND WAS NOT CONDITIONAL OR CON-
TINGENT. 
(74-2-1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Interpretation 
of Wills: 
A will is to be construed according to the intention 
of the testator. Where his intention cannot have effect 
to its full extent, it must have effect as far as possible. 
In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P 748. 
recites: "Intention of testator is ultimate object 
to be kept in mind and to which all rules must yield. 
(74-2-2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
In case of uncertainty arising upon the face of a will 
as to the application of any of its provisions, the testa-
tor's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
will, taking into view the circumstances under which it 
was made, exclusive of his oral declarations. 
(74-2-10) Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be 
preferred which will prevent a total intestacy. 
In re Hill's Estate. (Oregon Case) 256 P2nd 735. 
"A will is not unnatural because it excludes one's 
next of kin in preference to those who may have en-
joyed a closer and perhaps an affectionate relationship 
with testator. 
Testator has right to dispose of his property by will 
as it pleases him and without consideration for blood or 
legal ties. 
Through his will, testator is invested by law with 
substantially all rights he enjoyed in life to make un-
fettered disposition of his property, and will is not to 
be set aside in absence of convincing evidence that test-
ator was wanting in testamentary capacity at time will 
was executed or that testator was subjected to undue 
influence of another, resulting in substitution of such 
other's will for testator's own voluntary volition." 
In re Holman's Will, 42 Or. 345, 70 Pac. 908. 
Justice Wolverton, speaking for the Court, said: 
"The right of one's absolute domination over his 
property is sacred and inviolable, so that he may do 
what he will with his own, if it is not to the injury 
of another. He may bestow it whithersoever he will 
and upon whomsoever he pleases, and this without 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
regard to natural or legitimate claims upon his 
bounty; and if there exists no defect of donative 
capacity, whereby his individual will or judgment 
does not have intelligent and conscious play in the 
bestowal, or undue influence or fraud, whereby an 
unconscionable advantage may be taken of him 
through the wicked designs of another, the law will 
give effect to the disposition; and the right to dis-
pose of one's property by will and bestow it upon 
whomsoever he likes is a most valuable incident 
to ownership and does not depend upon its judi-
cious use. And this court has held in effect that 
while it seems harsh and cruel that a parent should 
disinherit one of his children and devise his property 
to others, or cuts them all off and devise it to 
strangers, from some unworthy motive, yet so long 
as that motive, whether from pride or aversion 
or spite or prejudice is not resolvable into mental 
perversion, no court can interfere." 
The appellant and contestant las~ saw the testator 
in 1938, therefore the relationship between them, al-
though brothers, was very remote and distant; the re-
spondent was a first cousin to the testator and had a 
close social relationship with him, it is only natural 
that the respondent should be the object of his bounty. 
The bequest of testator's complete portion of the estate 
left by testator's father, Witton W. Ellerbeck, had nothing 
to do with his concern about his business and the pay-
ments of bills, but was intended as an absolute and non-
contingent bequest. 
Being in the Holy Cross Hospital from digestive 
and other troubles and being concerned that he might 
not survive, induced the testator to make the will in 
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question and he expressed his intention in making un-
fettered disposition by his own hand of his complete 
portion of the estate left by his father, namely, Wit-
ton W. Ellerbeck. 
To say that the present will is a contingent will, 
even though the bequest to the respondent has no bear-
ing whatsoever on a contingency that may have existed, 
would destroy the testator's right to his sacred and in-
violable right to do what he desired with his own. 
57 Am. Jur. p. 454. Sec. 672. 
Whether or not a will is to be regarded as contin-
gent depends upon the intention of the testator. Courts 
will not regard a will conditional or contingent un-
less the intention of the testator to make it so clearly 
appears. The Court should not read into a will a con-
dition of its operative effect which upon a reasonable 
interpretation of the language of the will is not to be 
found therein. The general rule of construction that fa-
vors an interpretation which will prevent intestacy 
operates to require that a will be construed to be un-
conditional in case of doubt on that score. A will is 
not made conditional by statements therein which have 
no reasonable or logical relation to the testator's property 
or to the objects of his bounty. A statement in the will 
of circumstances which merely indicate the necessity of 
a will does not render the will contingent or conditional. 
A will is not conditional if the contingency expressed 
in the instrument is referred to merely as the occasion or 
inducement for making the will. If the language used in 
a will can by any reasonable interpretation be construed 
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7 
to mean that the testator referred to a possible danger 
or threatened calamity only as a reason for making 
his will at that time, the courts incline towards holding 
that the . will is not contingent upon the occurence of 
such danger or calamity. 
Ferguson vs. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119, 45 SW2, 1090, 
79 ALR 1163 
Barber vs. Barber, 368 Ill. 215; 13 NE2 257, 
Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331; 66 A. 92 
In Ferguson vs. Ferguson, 121 Tex. 119; 45 SW2 
1090, 79 ALR 1163 
The court is guided at the outset by well recog-
nized rules of construction in arriving at the testatrix' 
intent. Briefly, these rules are as follows: 
(1) The fact that testatrix left a will implies that 
she did not intend to die intestate. Alexander on Wills, 
vol. 1, p. 123, Sec. 105. 
(2) A will is construed to be a general and not a 
contingent will, unless the intention to the contrary clear-
ly appears either expressly or by necessary implica-
tion from a reading of the language o~ the will as a whole. 
Eaton vs. Brown, 193 U. S. 411, 24 S. Ct. 487, 40 Cyc. 
1082. 
(3) If the event mentioned in the will merely indi-
cates the inducement which caused the testatrix to 
make the will, and her intent to make it contingent 
is not apparent,. the will is entitled to probate as a 
general will. R. C. L. 121, p. 166. 
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( 4) If the will is open to two constructions, that 
interpretation will be given it which will prevent intes-
tacy. Alexander on Wills, vol. 1, p. 123, Sec. 105. 
Now referring to the purported will of Ben B. 
Eller beck: 
An examination of the will indicates that his main 
desire was to make the bequest of his complete portion 
of the estate left by his father, Witton W. Ellerbeck, to 
the respondent and not to die intestate. His will indi-
cates that he had fixed notions as to who was to receive 
his property. 
In the case of Eaton vs. -Brown, 193 U. S. 412, 24 S. 
Ct. 487, 488, 48 L. Ed. 730 Justice Holmes holds that the 
character of the bequests made may be looked to in 
deciding whether a contingent will was intended. 
The bequest of testator's complete portion of the 
estate left by his father had nothing to do with his con-
cern about his business and the payments of hi~ bills, but 
was intended as an absolute and non-contingent be-
quest. 
His expression, "Being in the Holy Cross Hos-
pital from digestive and other troubles, in the event that 
I do not survive," merely recites the circumstances which 
induced the testator to make the will. 
In Dougherty vs. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 
31, 88 S.W. 1113, it was said: 
"The current of modern authority, seems to be that. 
if the happening of the event is merely referred to as 
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giving the reason or inducement for the making of the 
will, it be held unconditional." 
In the will before the Court, Mrs. Haws by said 
will was to receive of testator's bounty. If the fact that 
he was in the Holy Cross Hospital and did not survive 
this particular illness had been the condition of this 
bounty, an hypothesis which is to the last degree im-
probable, it is not to be believed that when he came 
to explain his will, he would not have explained it 
with reference to the extraordinary contingency upon 
which he made it depend, instead of going on to make a 
bequest which on the face of it, is an unconditional gift. 
57 Am. Jur. p. 457, Sec. 677. Where it is doubtful 
whether the will is contingent upon the occurence of an 
event, the circumstances under which the will is ex-
ecuted, as well as the language of the instrument, may 
be considered. 54 ALR 933. The fact that the testator 
preserves the document for a long time after the pass-
ing of the time for the occurence of a possible event 
mentioned in the will is admissible in evidence as tend-
ing to show that the possibility of the occurrence was 
a mere inducement for the making of the will and not 
a condition precedent to the operation of the will. 
Barber vs. Barber, 368 Ill. 216. 13 N.E. 2nd 257. 
Now, let us see what actually happened to the will 
in question. The testator made the will in his own hand-
writing. The will was given to Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws, 
the respondent, who held it in her possession until the 
testator returned to his home, when she returned it to 
him saying: "Well, here is the will" and he said, 
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"Well, I will show you where I will put it," and he put 
it in the cupboard where it was found the day of his 
death." (R 36) 
In answer to the questions put to Mrs. Haws by 
Mr. Roberts, attorney for the appellant and contestant: 
Q. "But in any event he finally recovered from this 
sickness, did he not? 
Answer: I would say yes. 
Q. You saw him working around the yard and shop 
after that didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he appeared to be all right? 
A. Yes. 
68 Corpus Juris 631. Wills. Sec. 256. 
The condition must appea~ upon the face of the will 
and parol evidence is not admissible to show that an 
instrument which in form is a general or absolute will 
was intended to take effect only upon a contingency. 
Parol evidence is admissible, however, to show that the 
testator's intention was to make an absolute and not a 
contingent will, so evidence of the preservation of the 
document for a considerable time after the non happen-
ing of the contingency, or the expiration of the time of 
imp-ending calamity, is admissible to show that the testa-
tor regarded the contingency as relating to the motive 
inducing the making of the will rather than as a condition 
to its becoming operative and such evidence has been 
held to raise a presumption that the will was intended 
to be absolute and noncontingent." 
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Page on Wills, Vol. 1. Section 96. Contingent Wills. 
"'In one group of cases the problem is whether the 
language employed makes the will conditional or whether 
it merely recites the circumstances which have induced 
the testator to make the will in question. In another 
group of cases the problem is whether the language em-
ployed makes the entire will conditional or whether it 
attaches .a condition merely to the clause of the will 
in connection with which such conditions is expressed. 
The general tendency of the courts is. to regard the 
will as absolute rather than conditional unless the lang-
uage employed by the testator unequivocally shows his 
intention to make the entire will conditional. 
The problem is presented "Whether testator merely 
recites such anticipated circumstances of his death as 
the motives which induced him to make his will. 
There is quite a strong tendency to treat such pro-
visions, whether possible as descriptive of the motives 
which induce testator to make his will and not as con-
ditions on which the validity of the will depends. 
The surrounding facts may be considered in de-
termining whether or not testator intended a contin-
gent will, if the instrument is ambiguous. 
Barber vs. Barber 368 Ill. 215, 13 N.E. 2nd 257. 
In re Will of Tinsley, 18 Ia. 23, 11 A.L.R. 826. It is 
said that the fact that the testator kept the will for 
some time after the event happened tends to show that 
testator did not intend a contingent will. 
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Page on Wills, Vol. 1, Sec. 100. Contingency limited to 
part of will. 
If the language of a will left it fairly in doubt 
whether testator intends the contingency to apply to the 
entire will, or to some of the gifts therein, the construc-
tion which makes the will as a whole unconditional is 
preferred. 
Massie vs. Griffith, 59 Ky. 364. 
Lee vs. Kirby 186 Ky. 603, 217 S.W. 895. 
Ganaway vs. Ganaway, 246 Ky. 722, 56 S.W. 2. 
Damon vs. Damon, 90 Mass. 192. "Where the first 
bequest began, "First, if by casualty or otherwise, I 
should lose my life during this voyage" and the subse-
quent bequests do not refer to such conditions, it was 
held that the will as a whole was unconditional," 
Walker vs. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795. 215 S. W. 800, 11 
A.L.R. 823; 
recites the rule of construction: "If there is a reas-
onable doubt as to whether a will is intended to be con-
tingent or permanent, the doubt will be resolved in 
favor of the permanency. 
In Massie vs. Griffith, 2 Met. 364., the will recites: 
"It is my wish that all the notes and accounts found 
among my paper vs. my brothers, should be destroyed 
or handed over to them. Should I never return. I also 
desire that each of them should have $200.00 in ad-
dition, and the remainder of my property divided equally 
between the heirs of Thomas and John M. Massie." 
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Massie who was a resident of Kentucky made a visit 
to Missouri and while there wrote the above. 
The court states: It will be observed that the words 
"should I never return" are to be found about the 
middle of it, and the court rules it was not a contingent 
will because the only words it contained indicating its 
contingent nature were not applicable to the whole 
writing but only to a part of it. 
The situation presented by the case at bar, the refer-
ence to being in the hospital and "in the event that I do 
not survive, Mrs. Ruth Clayton _Haws -is to take full 
charge of my home and such little business as may 
exist there," is not applicable in any way to the sentence: 
"Further, she is to have my complete portion of the es-
tate left by my father, namely Witton W. Ellerbeck" 
or the "P. S. I appoint Mrs. Ruth Clayton Haws, to serve 
as executrix without bond." 
Appellant's own statement of Webster's definition 
of the word "Further" meaning "in addition" "more-
' ' 
over," "furthermore" breaks the application of the con-
dition of the first sentence. 
In reference to the cases cited by appellant: 
Bagnall vs. Bagnall, 225 S. W. 2nd 401, the will shows 
on its face that it was executed at a time when the 
testator had in mind an intention to take a trip of some 
character and was intended to become effective only on 
condition that something should happen to him while on 
that trip; that two disinterested witnesses testified with-
out contradiction that Bagnall told them that he wrote the 
instrument in question just before starting on a fish-
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ing trip and that he meant it to apply only for that trip. 
Bagnall died 18 years after the making of the will in 
question. Therefore, Bagnall at all times intended that 
the will was a conditional will. 
In Wilson vs. Higgason, 207 Ark. 32 178 S. W. 2nd 855, 
the instrument considered was a letter addressed to a 
relative and was in no way a direct bequest. At three 
different places in the instrument the writer states "in 
case I should die any any time soon." She did not die 
until 12¥2 years thereafter. The instrument in ques-
tion was defeated by its own limited conditions. 
In Wilson vs. Higgason, 207 Ark. 32 18 S. W. 2nd 855~ 
Civ, App, 31, 88 S.W. 1113, the instruments in question 
were letters addressed to a friend and not direct bequests. 
The words of the letters indicate clearly that they were 
written merely as an expedient in case of death result-
ing from the operation referred to. In addition to this 
the property referred to in the letters was disposed of. 
showing that there was no intention that the letters 
should be recognized as an unconditional will. 
In reference to the case Walker vs. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 
795, 215 S. W. 800 11 A.L.R. 832 the letter was a con-
ditional paper which was never delivered to the person 
for whom it was intended. The paper does not contain, 
as wills usually do, a direct devise or gift of property 
but is a request or direction to her Aunt to see that 
Gomersall got all her property in the event she died 
as the result of the operation. If she survived the opera-
tion, it is clear that the request could have no force or 
effect whatsoever as it was only to be effective in the 
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event she died under the operation. Because the direc-
tion to her Aunt and the devise to Gomersall are so 
coupled together that when one failed or became in-
operative so did the other. 
In the case of Davis vs. Davis 107 Miss. 245. 65 S.O. 
241 the instrument in question is a letter to the mother 
of the writer depriving his estranged wife of any parti-
cipation in his estate. The letter referred to in fact was 
not a will, the contingency upon which its validity de-
pended had never happened. In the letter he express-
ly states that he loved his wife dearly and he hoped 
she would return to him, and that he would not have 
"to give her up." The whole gist of the instrument was 
contingent. 
In Ellison vs. Smoot's administrator, 286 Ky. 768, 
151 S. W. 2nd 1017, the sentence referred to was only 
a casual statement and not intended as a will. Mrs. 
Lucas the writer did survive and lived for 2 years and 
4 months before being killed in an accident. 
None of these cases are in point with the document 
before this court, as the will of Ben B. Ellerbeck is in 
form a will, making a direct bequest to Mrs. Haws and 
finally appointing her as executrix of said instrument. 
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CONCLUSION 
The finding of the trial court is supported by compe-
tent evidence, therefore it is binding on this court on 
appeal. 
Beagley v. Gypsum Co., (Utah) 235 P. 2d 783, 
Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, (Utah) 240 P. 2d 
973. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Backman, Backman and Clark, 
Attorneys for Proponent and 
Respondent 
515 Zion's Savings Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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